It is in the corporate best interest for safety management to be pro-active and provide input from analyses to the impacted public concerningresidual risk associated with projects, in addition to the normally expected support to design engineering and project management from conceptual design through final disposal of project waste.
INTRODUCTION
To illustrate means identified for the implementation and verification of risk control measures beyond the minimum effort involved with traditional hazard reports included as appendices to analyses, the program assurance activitiesassociated with a major wind tunnel complex renovation project at the Ames Research Center will be discussed.
Many different issues are involved in the process of assuring effective risk reduction and hazard control. Considerations identified in the project underdiscussion included preliminary activities, concurre-nt activities, post analysis activities, and post operational follow-up.
Acronyms & abbreviations AE architectural engineer NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration. risk baseline identification of risk inherent to a facility or complex tailoring adapting requirements or activities
PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES

I Tailoring activities
The risk management process was tailored to this specific project. The tailoring included planning different analyses for different phases and work packages in the project, with some analyses designed to provide higher level overviews and other fault trees and failure mode & effect analyses designed to provide detailedevaluation ofcritical design work packages. The tailoring also included budget estimates for risk management efforts through the expected developmental life-cycle.
Background research
During the background research for project hazard analyses, an extensive effort was made to identify and to list for later traceability, all related system documentation particularly appropriate drawings and subsequently to become as familiar as possible with that information.
Communications with end-user personnel
Opening a channel of communication with end user personnel contributcd to the background research and provided system critical historical insights and failure data which in customized systems might otherwise have becn unavailable. Eventually these end-users began to bring unsolicited design concerns to the program assurance group for risk analysis and concurrent engineering.
Establishing the risk baseline
Performing a baseline hazard analysis on the existing tunnel complex, provided a baseline of inherent risk, which allowed a clear-cut definition of work within the current project scope and provided definition of interface hazards or other system hazards where system/facility modifications are planned. With a 45 year old system such as the one in this project, a baseline was most important.
Many of the problems identified in the facility were clearly outside the scope of the modernization project effort and were accepted by the facility user personnel for resolution. The assignment of risk either to the project or facility user i.e. production personnel was an interesting exercise since the production personnel werealso thecustomer. Ultimately decisions were made relative to ownership of the hazards and how they were to be resolved.
Identifiing the impacted public
Several of the aforementioned issues contributed to the identification of the potentially impacted public. This was an important issue particularly given the age of the complex. Environmental issues were primarily those which could have affected a public larger than the immediatc work force. It was US Government work not protected by US copyright 1994 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium even more complicated however, since project budget and work scope were defined but the user wish list continued to expand during the several-year-long design process when problems occurred with the definition of which hazards were within the project scope. This also reflected on risk management as determinations were made between engineering and production (the customer) as to who had financial responsibility for added hazard controls. One basic project philosophy was that any systems which were modified by the project would be brought up to code in every way. This clarified responsibility for many issues from the outset of the project.
The issue of credibility
Developing and maintaining professional credibility with project and user staff personnel can be a never ending challenge. Acceptanceofdesign input from the program assurance group is much easier for project design engineers once the credibility gap has been bridged.
CONCURRENT ACTIVITIES
Concurrent staff review
Involvingas many staff engineers as possible in reviews of appropriate parts of the system safety analyses provided a valuable multi-disciplinary review and enhanced the accuracy of the analyses. A serious effort was put into the system safety analyses by the AE. Unfortunately this effort was heavily weighted in bottom-up techniques, which were ultimately too detailed. The coordination of efforts by the contributing design engineers, was supervised by a senior design engineer who did not have a lot of program assurance experience. This required a lot of rework by NASAlater to get the maximum benefit from this work.
This was further amplified by significant problems encountered as the AE tried to understand the system operation from existing as-built drawings and occasional site visits, while the AE was located approximately two thousand miles away from the wind tunnel complex. Also the AE distributed parts of their work to different divisions who didn't all follow the same codes or work easily together. It became increasingly important to identify AE errors in understanding the tunnel functionsduring final design.
End user review
In addition to the valuable technical review provided by work package managers on the project, user staff personnel also provided hours of valuable technical input to all of the major safety analyses performed on the project. This concurrent effort authenticated the analysis and removed majorconcernsof analyses failing to include subsystems or not understanding adequately how they operate.
3rd party analysis (Independent Analysis)
To balance the bottom-up approach practiced by the AE's system safety work, a 3rd party analysis was contracted to provide a top-down comparison. This effort utilized independent safety analysis and a modified probabilistic risk assessment technique to verify the validity of previous analyses in critical areas.The credibility of thesystem safety engineer who performed this analysis was so high with the project design engineers, that she was constantly asked for direct design input which slowed down her safety analysisefforts but benefited the project and was really appreciated by project management.
Hazard control review process
The hazard controls process involved a concurrent program assurance assessment of system hazards, work package manager response to recommended hazard controls and project managerapproval of same. The hazardswith critical/catastrophic outcomes were also reviewed by a project management board chaired by the program assurance manager to verify the appropriateness of the hazard controls. After this level of project approval an additional approval is required by an end user manager to verify that there is no conflict with existing facility controls or operational procedures. This final approval provides some reassurance that the controls will interface well with the existing facility and will remain in place after the facility modifications are complete. This activity also assures a warning for the impacted public (i.e. user) of the residual risk after the facility modifications.
This control review process was continuous from first drafts through final design. Some controls were changed to the extent that additional review by the managcmcnt evaluation board members was required to get continued concurrence based on the control design changes.
POSTANALYSIS REWEWAND TESTiNG
Institutional safety review and test
Inherent to the acceptance of the hazard control design is the eventual verification of the design concept through actual system testing. This phase iscarefully monitored and documented to verify that risk acceptance which was previously predicated upon implementation of the final design now has been verified by actual test. The risk management process is incomplete without this activity. But precautions should be identified in an operating hazard analysis or some facsimile to preclude incidents during the subsystem and system testing particularly when the sheer size of the facility requires months of testing and new design modifications are difficult to bring back on-line.
The impacted public and designer stand shoulder to shoulder during these tests to verify the efficacy of the myriad previous design reviews.
Facility operational readiness review
This review providcs a final assurance that analyses and previous reviews have been performed correctly, controls are in place, and the facility is ready to operate. During this review and definitely prior to start-up of the complex, any remaining hazard control issues will be resolved or the user will not receive approval from the center director to resume opcrations.
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POST START-UP ACTIVITIES
I Audits
Program assurance will audit the use and maintenance of the newly designed hazard controls within a few months of bringing the wind tunnels back on line. Despite any previous assurance, user reviews, meetings etc. this is the only means of verifying that controls are left in place and accomplishing the protection of the subsystcms they were designed for.
System safety analysis report
After the complex is operational, a final system safety analysis report will be prepared to review the status of the baseline hazard analysis versus the analyses which have been performed during the facility modernization to evaluate final residual risk. This information should also be communicated to users through appropriate channels.
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